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Abstract In its critical comparative overview of foresight
methods and how they are used by different futures institutes
in Europe, North America, and their partners, the text argues
that while many futures institutes claim to provide foresight
expertise, few actually provide the tools needed by policy
makers to help prepare for security risks. It identifies two
trademarks of genuine security foresight experts: 1.) They will
differentiate between trends and futures research 2.) Their
methods will have met with success in providing early warning
signals. These methods often come from the fields of statistical
analysis and computer simulation, but can be enriched by
human judgment which tests modeling results in the real world.
Keywords Foresight . Security risks . Crisis early warning .
Agent-basedmodeling . System dynamics . Futures institutes
In a globalized era where futures studies can provide warning
signals for security threats, cooperation among the major
futures studies players in Europe and its allies in North
America and beyond is vital. Civil unrest, ethnic conflict,
terrorist attacks, or state-led discrimination can have an impact
on the security of neighboring states or even strategic partners
a continent away. Yet while those claiming to have foresight
prowess have created lucrative business opportunities, not all
groups use scientifically reliable methods useful for
preventing security risks. Making unified progress on security
policy and global cooperation between institutes even more
difficult, many institutes use futures research vocabulary dif-
ferently. This article discusses the methodology and futures
lingo used by foresight companies and institutes. Specifically,
it focuses on an overview of which of their quantitative
methods can provide early warning mechanisms in military
and political security.1
In scanning the literature provided by futures institutes about
themselves, as well as their publications, two main observations
stand out: 1.)While “pop futurism” confuses popular trends with
futures research, the genuine expert will know the difference [2].
2.) One can identify the real security foresight specialist by his or
her use of methods that have met with success in providing
early warning signals. These methods often come from the
fields of statistical analysis and computer simulation, but can
be enriched by human judgment which tests modeling results
in the real world.
Different lexicons
Among the most common vocabulary used interchangeably
are “trends” and “futures research” [2]. While trends are a
movement in one specific direction over time [3, 4] with a
duration of 3 to 5 years [5], futures research is an interdisci-
plinary approach to “gaining understanding of how today’s
conditions and trends will likely shape the future (…) and how
the future conditions could be shaped by policies and actions
taken (…) today” [6].
1 In this article, we focus on futures methods concerned with assisting
military and political security. Paul Williams defines “military security”
as the “interplay between the armed offensive and defensive capabilities
of states,” and political security as “focused on the organizational stability
of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them their
legitimacy” [1, p. 4].
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Many companies believed they were conducting futures
research when actually they were merely looking at trends in
market values, stock shares, or cultural mores. For this pur-
pose, our interdisciplinary team has created a glossary con-
taining definitions used by the Futures Research community,
and has highlighted one, streamlined definition which can be
used by anyone conducting research in the field of futures
r e sea r ch (v i ew g los sa ry he r e : www.un ibw.de /
internationalepolitik/projekte/projekte/Zukunftsanalyse/) [7].
When governments want to find a futures institute which
can advise them on security issues, they will need to sort
through the countless institutes with “futures” in the name
which perform more qualitative research, with the aim of
either looking at trends, as opposed to forecasts or early
warning systems, or at self-realization techniques such as
“visioning,” which helps one envision a utopian future for
oneself or one’s company.
While many futures institutes, such as the World Future
Society, the Centre for Futures Studies and the Foresight
Institute offer the “Delphi” technique, which consists of con-
vening a panel of experts to analyse trends or make future
predictions, the predictions made by these experts are only as
accurate as the methods used by each. Other institutes, such as
Kairos Future in Stockholm, tout the use of “road mapping,” a
visualization of a future goal based on the metaphor of navi-
gation. Institutes such as Tamkang University or The Futures
Academy in Dublin use a “futures wheel,” which refers to the
visualization of the consequences of trends through diagram-
ming them on a wheel. 2 These methods do not necessarily
provide warning signals for the future so much as they are
simply a diagram or visualization of goals, desires and
outcomes.
Futures methods helpful for security foresight
Partnerships between futures institutes in Europe, the United
States and Asia can be strengthened to assist in crisis planning
and early warning systems for the prevention of national
security and economic threats. This requires openness to using
different futures methodologies and a knowledge of which
methods are most helpful in predicting security risks. In
addition to using a different futures lexicon, the institutes
use very different methodologies.
While early futures institutes produced futures research
methods such as scenarios or computer simulations for de-
fense purposes, by the time futures research giant Theodore
Gordon had founded several of the first U.S. futures think
tanks, it became clear that distinctions were needed for
different methodologies [8, 9].3 Gordon differentiated be-
tween quantitative and qualitative methods, and between ex-
ploratory and normative methods [10].
Quantitative methods are “mathematically based, using
equations and precise measuring instruments, and are illus-
trated by methods such as time-series analysis, the cohort/
component method, computer simulations, and survey re-
search” [8, p. 243].
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, do not rely on
numbers or statistical analyses. Methods such as business
gaming, causal layered analysis, simulation, and Delphi are
frequently used by foresight think tanks, but foresight experts
in the security field will not use these alone to make accurate
security predictions. They can be used as a second layer to
complement other quantitative methods. Methods may also
include a mix of both, when empirical data is used for spec-
ulative purposes. While quantitative methods may be more
easily assessed for their reliability, a mix of methods can also
provide a researcher with a greater number of future alterna-
tives. Here is an outline of the top methodologies used for
security foresight, and the strengths and weaknesses of each.




Most futures institutes rely on qualitative methods for their
forecasts. However, a handful of the most respected futures
institutes, such as RAND [9], the Fund for Peace and RAHS
Singapore have based their research or software on combina-
tions of qualitative and quantitative methods. Research and
tools from these institutes are being used by governments to
receive early warnings when energy, economic and demo-
graphic changes are about to lead to crisis, or to predict failed
states, violent conflict, and government instability. One mark
of the real security foresight expert is his or her ability to
create, use or contribute to software which is able to either
simulate the future on the computer, or make projections
based on statistical analysis. Below is a list of the methods
best suited to security foresight when using statistical methods
on the one hand, or computer simulation methods on the other.
Statistical methods
Statistical methods are being used by futures institutes tomake
long term projections or produce early warning systems for
policy makers in the security field. These include interfaces or
2 See Universität der Bundeswehr München’s Futures Studies Glossary
under : www.unibw.de/internationalepolitik/projekte/projekte/
Zukunftsanalyse/.
3 Gordon’s think tanks include Institute for the Future and The Futures
Group, which grossed $20 million per year by 1990.
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software using methods such as time series analysis and
indicator-based models employing real world data for the
explanatory variables.
Indicator-based models
Commonly employed modeling methodologies using in-
dicators generated from real world data include logistic
regression models, artificial neural networks, and other
classification algorithms. Indicators generated from real
world data have also been employed as part of early
warning indices that do not explicitly model the rela-
tionship between a set of independent variables and a
dependent variable.
The Fund for Peace’s annual “Failed States Index” is
an example of such an index. The indicators used in the
index, such as the legitimacy of the state and the
security apparatus, demographic pressure, and develop-
ment, measure state weakness. While the Failed States
Index is not a forecasting tool, it allows for the identi-
fication of security risk factors across countries and time
periods [11].4
Indicator-based models have also been developed for
gaining insights into the economic and political cause of
conflict onset, as well as explicitly for forecasting pur-
poses.5 Recently developed crisis early warning models
such as those produced by Goldstone, Bates, Epstein,
et al. (2010) are examples of models using structural
indicators to help determine when civil war or adverse
regime change might occur. While far from producing
outstanding results when tested against small observation
windows, they have increased accuracy when considering
longer observation windows, for example, by asking
whether a certain country would experience an instability
event within the next 5 years rather than in 2 years from
now. Goldstone et al. have even produced several models
that are able to predict state failure or civil war with 80 %
accuracy 2 years in advance [12, 13].
The questions policy-makers need to answer with
respect to the specification of such models are: Is a
high rate of false positives worse than a missed failure
case? How many times more “costly” is it to miss out
on a future failure case than to misclassify a country
that will remain stable?
With respect to the policy-relevant implications of existing
forecasting models, one striking finding is that “partial de-
mocracies” were found to be at significantly increased risk for
the onset of different types of political crises such as civil war,
adverse regime changes, and political instability than either
full democracies or autocracies across a range of studies
[12–15]. Future policy-oriented research among cooperating
futures institutes could thus shed further light on the question
of which causal dynamics lead to instability onsets and to
what extent external influences could mitigate the risk of
instability onsets in these countries.
Times series models
Times series models are used by institutes such as the
Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies, Stanford Research
Institute, Virtual Research Associates, the Naval Postgraduate
School and Tamkang University to collect and analyse histor-
ical quantitative data in a specific area. Amathematical form is
found for relating one parameter, such as time, to another.
Their emphasis lies on forecast accuracy rather than on
causality.
For example, Virtual Research Associates has produced the
GeoMonitor to help predict indicators with relationship to
country stability. It produces an automated rating of news
updates, and converts indexes with the possibility of graphing
the interaction between individual countries and groups of
countries. Its prospects tool also uses historic structural data
of a country to develop and optimize algorithms for the
prediction of long term country stability.
Time series models are helpful in producing mid- to long-
term predictions for time series that exhibit low levels of
volatility, such as certain demographic or economic variables.
Time series models have also seen applications in security
forecasting in the past, in particular as part of event data-based
crisis early warning models [16, 17]. Within these models,
time-series analysis is used to extrapolate time series data into
the future on average levels of conflict and cooperation pres-
ent within a specific country or among specific actors.
Time series analysis can also produce an initial forecast,
and then be improved by using qualitative analysis as an
interim step. For example, the initial extrapolation data can
be analyzed by numerous regional experts who input addi-
tional variables and nexus points and rerun the formula to




Agent-based models have been used by institutes such as the
Institut Futur in Berlin and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency-financed Integrated Crisis Early Warning
4 Senior Researcher Nate Haken was also interviewed on the crafting of
the Failed States Index at the Fund for Peace by the Universität der
Bundeswehr on October 8, 2013.
5 For studies on the causes of conflict, see: [50–53]. For models explicity
developed for forecasting purposes, see: [12–14, 19, 49, 54].
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System. An agent-based model is a computational model
which simulates interactions between agents in a given static
or dynamic environment in order to evaluate the system as a
whole [18, p. 172–216]. The Integrated Crisis Early Warning
System used agent-based models to forecast the occurrence of
various types of conflict for 28 countries in the US Pacific
Command [19, p. 96].6
Agent-basedmodels in general are most useful for studying
behavioral rule-based processes that lack central coordination
and that are characterized by a high degree of localization and
distribution and dominated by discrete decisions [20, p. 24].
However, these models were not developed for forecasting
purposes and are more concerned with explaining events than
predicting them [21, p. 146–147].
Agent-based modeling has also been frequently used in
political science to explain the occurrence and progress of
internal crisis such as insurgencies, rebellions, and civil war
[e.g. 22–29]. The overall forecasting validity is difficult to
assess, since future observations are by nature impossible, and
if verification is done based on past events, data can be
skewed.
System dynamics
System dynamics, first conceived as a modeling methodology
by MIT’s Jay Forrester, is a theory of system structure and a
set of tools used in identifying, depicting and analyzing multi-
loop, nonlinear feedback relationships [30]. It was initially
developed to analyze management problems and industrial
processes, but is now used by futures institutes to analyze
social and political phenomena.
Institutes such as the Universität der Bundeswehr’s
COMTESSA have used it to examine what Germany’s
Electricity industry will look like in 2025 and to gain foresight
for worldwide energy alternatives, which helps allies’ security
planning on a global scale [31].
Since system dynamics is good at modeling complex in-
terdependencies and for policy analysis and design, it can
provide highly accurate forecasting performance if functional
relationships are properly modeled. System dynamics has
seen applications with security-relevant implications in the
past. For example, it has frequently been used to explain the
occurrence and development of insurgencies, in explaining
the behavior of insurgent groups, and in analyzing future
prospects for country stability [32–39]. It can be used tomodel
combat, examine the prospects for the occurrence of nefarious
technology development in specific countries, and for gener-
ating scenarios for the future development of key industries
within a specific country [40–43].
Scenarios
Scenarios are useful for futures institutes working with gov-
ernment planners, corporate strategists and military analysts.
Institutes such as RAND use the method as it is useful for
military and security planning for middle to long-term fore-
casting, where unexpected events or discontinuities could play
a large role. They are not useful if one has little time, one
needs an exact forecast, or a clear methodology is needed.
Herman Kahn, who founded the Hudson Institute, is con-
sidered the father of scenario methods. He invented the meth-
od while working at RAND in connection with military and
strategic studies [44, 45]. Specifically, he looked at scenarios
in which nuclear war could be possible, what its fallout would
be, and what possible responses could be. Today, such sce-
narios can be used as part of a computer simulation to evaluate
alternatives to pre-programmed parameters, events, and inter-
actions [46].
Wild cards
A major obstacle in any futures research is related to how to
incorporate wildcards and weak signals into the analysis.
Weak signals are small changes that are currently observable
but may only trigger bigger changes in the future. These can
be incorporated into statistical models, where accounting for
certain destabilizing events in conjunction with latent struc-
tural risk factors may allow for the early-warning of an
impending political crisis [47]. Likewise, unexpected out-
comes may result from agent-based simulations as emergent
phenomena due to micro-level interactions with initially un-
clear implications.
In contrast, wild cards are events that cannot be predicted
or fully anticipated, but at the same time, have the potential to
“alter the international system by their reversal of significant
trends, thereby undermining the facts upon which future plan-
ning is built” [48]. Since the probability for their occurrence
and inmany cases their exact nature will be unknown, they are
difficult to incorporate into statistical models and computer
simulations. Nevertheless, a real security foresight expert
must leave room to calculate the unknowns. Nate Silver does
this by assigning a value to epistemological uncertainty—“the
limits of our knowledge” [29]. By using Bayer’s Theorem, he
is able to calculate the posterior probability of a previously
unknown event. This involves assigning a value to the prior
probability and a value to a new event occurring or not, to
come to the posterior probability [29]. He recommends inte-
grating this method into computer simulations, but only in a
limited way—for running tests on all possible options. Human
judgment is then indispensable for testing the computer pre-
dictions in the real world, rather than within the comfortable
confines of a model, to improve accuracy [29].
6 The ICEWS-project attempted to forecast rebellions, insurgencies, do-
mestic political crises, ethnic/religious violence, international crises and
an index of instability for 28 countries.
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Conclusion
As security threats make continental divisions less important,
futures institutes should have more incentive to provide orga-
nizations such as NATO and the EU with the early warning
technology they need to protect our common interests. The
models may differ in methodology, or use a combination of
methodologies to make more accurate predictions.
While indicator-based models have produced highly accu-
rate early warning results y, system dynamicsmodels or agent-
based models have also been shown to be helpful for helping
policy makers make security predictions. Those who combine
the benefits of modeling with human judgment, allowing for
the unexpected, are best placed to aid in security foresight. As
institutes become more interested in lending their expertise to
foresight projects which contribute to our common security,
policy makers will be better enabled to prevent risks. This will
help them capitalize on conflict resolution opportunities which
have the power to expand stability and keep our communities
safe.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
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